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1

Introduction

Most research on non-human animals (hereinafter referred to as animals) in
volves clear harms for the animals used, either as a direct result of research
protocols or by virtue of the conditions under which the animals are kept. Ar
guably, however, although these harms are widely acknowledged, they have
not motivated significant change to the practice of animal research. In this
chapter, we focus on the damage to humans that can result from animal ex
perimentation and how this may act as an alternative driver of change.
Humans employed in animal research, whether inside animal housing or
the laboratory, confront significant stress as a result of what they routinely do
as part of their job, as well as by virtue of how that work is received by "outsid
ers" to animal research. These workplace stressors can result in physical and
psychological harms. It is well known that human patients may also be harmed
as a consequence of the epistemological shortcomings of research undertaken
on animals, which fails to translate to human clinical settings. Whilst we will
briefly discuss these kinds of physical and psychological harms, our primary
focus is the moral injury that can result from the practice of animal research.
Moral injury occurs when a disregard of someone's well-being causes them
harm. Typically, this is understood to encompass the kind of moral wrong that
may arise from systematic injustices or from criminal or violent acts. However,
moral injury is increasingly recognized as a problem for the perpetrators as
well as the victims of certain acts. Moral injury, thus, also occurs when a person
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is complicit in activities that they feel are morally wrong or transgressive. Mor
al injury as a phenomenon, in this sense, is well established in military situa
tions, where personnel may undertake or witness actions that would be illegal
or immoral in other settings.
Using arguments derived from the work of Axel Honneth (2006), we show
that animal research involves an institutionalized failure to recognize non
human animals that not only reifies animals but the human persons engaged
in this process, diminishing the scope of their moral agency and causing moral
injury. In this chapter, we begin by briefly articulating the harms to animals in
research and the more conventional harms to humans that can arise as a result
of animal research, before making a case for the ethical damage wrought by
the failures of recognition inherent within the system of animal research. We
conclude with a brief outline of our approach as a means of effecting change
in animal research.

2

Harms to Animals in Research

It is widely acknowledged that animals frequently suffer harms when used in
interventional biomedical research directed at human clinical benefit. These
harms may be the direct result of research protocols or relate to the conditions
in which animals are housed. Animals can experience pain and discomfort
when used in toxicology testing, the development of pharmaceuticals, vaccine
development, diagnostic techniques, and surgical research. The intervention
itself may be the source of distress, or, if the research protocol demands it,
prior infliction of an alien disease or condition on the animal may be a source
of suffering. Animals used in biomedical research are routinely killed at the
completion of a protocol or series of protocols. Although arguments can be
made that, in itself death may not amount to a harm for non-humans, the
manner in which animals are killed can be a source of concern, and there is
disagreement over what constitutes humane euthanasia (Hawkins et al., 2016).
Housing can be another source of harm for animals in research, since the en
vironment in which animals are kept may negatively impact their well-being.
Housing that is inexpensive, easy to handle, and clean may not provide the
best environment to meet the needs of animals. Animals may be harmed by
lack of access to conspecifics and adequate stimulation, the intrusion of light
and noise, inappropriate cage design, and so on (National Health and Medical
Research Council, 2013). Although most of these harms are well known, argu
ably, they have not motivated significant change in the practice of research.
For the remainder of this chapter, we focus instead on harms to humans from
animal research, which have received relatively little attention.
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Harms to Humans - Physical

For some time, it has been acknowledged that there are epistemological prob
lems in translating results obtained from animal experiments into human
clinical benefit. A number of reasons can be cited for this failure, including,
differences in physiology and metabolism between human and non-human
animals (LaFollette and Shanks, 1996); poorly conducted and inappropriately
evaluated animal experiments (Perel et al., 2007; Pound et al., 2004); and ani
mal stress due to many of the environmental factors identified above ( e.g. small
cage size, boredom, high levels of noise, etc.), which in tum has impact on
physiology and the reliability of scientific data obtained from animals (Akhtar,
Pippin and Sandusky, 2008; Baldwin, Primeau and Johnson, 2006; Burwell and
Baldwin, 2006; also see in this Volume: Herrmann, 2019;Jayne and See, 2019).
Irrespective of the reasons behind failures in translation, the consequences
are significant for human patients and those who work with animals. First, pa
tients may receive treatment that is inappropriate and harmful, if such treat
ments have "passed" animal testing but remain dangerous to humans (Pound
and Bracken, 2014 ). In these cases outcomes may include a heightened risk of
morbidity or mortality. There are also opportunity costs associated with pur
suing one form of intervention rather than another. Second, patients may not
receive treatments that could be beneficial, if they have "failed" animal tests,
i.e. the development of potentially fruitful interventions for humans may be
cut short by unsuccessful animal trials (Pound and Bracken, 2014). In addition,
research findings in animals, which have no validity for humans, can lead to
the misdirection of future financial resources and research efforts (Pound and
Bracken, 2014). The resources of funders, researchers, and human trial partici
pants may be effectively wasted in pursuit of what amounts to futile lines of
inquiry. These resources would be better spent on different treatments or dif
ferent forms of research, such as clinical trials, epidemiological studies, and
computer modelling, rather than on animal research.
Those who work in animal research are also at risk of harm. Exposure to
workplace stressors is associated with a range of negative outcomes (Britt
et al., 2016). People who are directly involved with animal research, whether
inside animal housing or the laboratory, face challenging issues in relation to
the animals in their care. These workers may witness or directly cause animals
to experience discomfort, pain, and suffering as part of an experimental pro
tocol. They may be required to infect animals with a disease, or impair their
function in some way, or euthanize them at the completion of the experimen
tal protocol. Research workers can experience a range of negative feelings
and health impacts (physiological, psychological, and social) as a result of
their involvement in research. During their work, some may experience guilt,
Kathrin Herrmann and Kimberley Jayne - 978-90-04-39119-2
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uneasiness, or frustration, as well as grief at the death of an animal in their care
(American Association for Laboratory Animal Science, 2003). The culture of
secrecy that cloaks much animal research limits discussion of these challenges
by workers, exacerbating the problems experienced.
For those who work as animal carers or as laboratory technicians, these
difficulties may be particularly pressing. Those who are employed to look af
ter animals, rather than carry out the research per se, have frequently chosen
their careers based on a love of animals; as such, they experience the harms
to animals in research as especially distressing (Birke, Arluke and Michael,
2007). Furthermore, these individuals may not have been routinized to animal
research in the same way as those who have trained as researchers, so they may
lack the coping mechanisms that may assist in addressing these issues (Birke,
Arluke and Michael, 2007). There is limited discussion of these harms in the lit
erature. In the remainder of this chapter, we focus on an even more neglected
area of harm to humans involved in animal research, namely, moral harm.

4

Harms to Humans - Moral

In order to make effective use of animals in research, those who work with
them must, to some extent, treat them as objects: objects of scientific inter
est. In order to do this, the subjectivity of the animal is disregarded or denied.
Its value comes not from what is intrinsic to it but from what others deem to
be useful. The animal is controlled, monitored, manipulated, and measured in
ways that, as we have suggested, often cause harm. This is not the same as, for
example, deliberate cruelty, sadism, or vindictiveness. The intention is not usu
ally to cause suffering but to achieve some other goal, for which the animal's
suffering is a necessary prerequisite or side effect. The animal is merely a means
to a scientific end, and those who are involved in the research must ensure that
they are able to view animals in this narrow way and treat them accordingly.
The treatment of human beings as objects or as mere means to scientific
ends is uncontroversially regarded as morally problematic. The validity of the
animal model aside, whether it is morally wrong to use animals in this way
depends partly on what moral theory one subscribes to. Most of those who
find it acceptable to use animals for research base their reasoning on the idea
that animals have a different moral status from human beings. Accordingly,
much of the debate about animal rights has revolved around the question of
what capacities are necessary or sufficient for full moral status, and whether
animals have these capacities (Bastian et al., 2012; DeGrazia, 1996; Singer, 2013).
However, we suggest that there are moral problems associated with the use of
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animals in research, regardless of their moral status. This is because, in order
to make use of them, we have to adopt a particular stance towards them that
requires a subjugation or diminution of our own moral agency. We can choose
to treat animals as subjects or as objects for our use. When we choose the lat
ter option, we reify them. Reification is a term with a complex political and
philosophical history. For the purposes of our discussion, we build primarily
on Honneth's use of the term (2006).

5

What Is Reification and How Does It Relate to Other Moral
Concepts?

Reification is a disposition or a mode of relating to others that can be a prod
uct of systems and institutions that compel people to behave in certain ways,
to treat others as mere things. It is, as Axel Honneth (2006) puts it, a social
pathology (p. 92 ). The concept of reification has some resonance with Kant's
formula of humanity. Kant insists that we should never treat other human
beings as mere means to our own ends, but always as ends in themselves.
Reification also has some resonance with the concepts of commodification,
objectification and inattention. Elisabeth Anderson (1990), for example, dis
cusses the commodification of women's labor in surrogacy. Commodification
is bad, she says, because it is mistaken. We fail to value the commodified
person and this is an error. The woman is inappropriately used - treated
as a thing - rather than respected. Anderson's view suggests that there are
fixed moral categories, and that we sometimes make mistakes in determining
how to categorize others. This implies that commodification is not intrinsi
cally wrong, only when we commodify the wrong entity. This is what occurs
in surrogacy, according to Anderson, whereas she may not think it wrong to
commodify animals used in research. We employ Honneth's (2006) approach
to argue a broader and more agnostic view. Given that we are sometimes
uncertain of how to respond to others, and we know that we are fallible and
self-interested, to cultivate a commodifying disposition may be intrinsically,
morally problematic.
Reification has similarities with what Kathie Jenni calls, vices of inattention
(2003).Jenni argues that it is through inattention that people who are horrified
when they know about factory farming, nevertheless, eat meat and try to avoid
thinking about the horrors involved in its production. Similar claims may be
made with regard to our reluctance to think about or discuss animal research.
Again, this suggests a specifically epistemological kind of problem: we lack
knowledge because we choose to look away instead of properly observing.
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In Anderson's (1990) account too, we make an epistemological mistake in mis
categorizing certain others. However, focusing on accidents, lack of attention,
and epistemological mistakes does not adequately capture the very deliberate
aspects of what occurs in animal research. It is for this reason that we find
reification a more compelling descriptor of the situation.
What is involved in animal research is not accidental. Indeed, reification
goes hand in hand with a very specific form of attention, certainly in science.
It is a reifying attention that denies not only the non-thing-ness of the ob
ject of research, but also the moral agency of the researcher, since the moral
relationship between researcher and research object is fixed by institutional
and external factors. The researcher cannot choose to relate to the animal as a
non-thing, at least not without sacrificing the scientific mantle.
In developing his understanding of reification, Honneth (2006) discusses
Lukacs' view of a world where caring has been subverted and replaced with
a pathological tendency towards reification (Lukacs, 1971). Honneth rejects
the concept of care as the counterpart of reification, in favor of the term rec
ognition. The phenomenon of reification and the means of addressing it are
central to our purposes, as we examine the ways in which animals are used in
research. Reification, according to Axel Honneth, is a deadening tendency that
distorts our ability to relate to the world around us. "[T]he subject is no longer
empathetically engaged in interaction with its surroundings but is instead
placed in the perspective of a neutral observer, psychically and existentially
untouched by its surroundings" (2006, pp. 98-99).
Reification is not inherent in specific actions but in a conjunction of the
action and disposition/intention. For this reason, there is no single means
by which we can point at a class of actions and say they are always wrong.
However, as we have suggested, it seems fairly clear that the scientific gaze is
likely to be a reifying one, even before any action has been taken. Indeed, doing
nothing can be compatible with reifying, if the reason for doing nothing is that
one regards the entity that is being ignored as a mere thing; for example, if one
fails to rescue an animal from a burning building.
It should be clear from our discussion so far that reification is deeply risky
for those who are reified. Whether human or animal, their interests, suffering,
and subjectivity are likely to go unnoticed or to be systematically devalued.
But the moral problems stemming from reification are not limited, specifically,
to the harm that it may cause to those who are reified. This is of particular
importance to our analysis of the human harms engendered through animal
research. Many people believe that provided certain standards of welfare are
met, and research protocols are subjected to ethical review, animal research is
not in itself unethical. However, animals remain research objects, and their life
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and well-being are precarious, since at the discretion of the researcher, they
may be harmed or euthanized. Indeed, one of the clearest indications that re
search animals are reified is the fact that, once their value to an experiment is
over, they are generally terminated. Animals will usually fight to preserve their
existence; but the intrinsic value of an animal's life to the animal itself is not
sufficient, in the research context, to allow it to live. We suggest that animal
research will remain morally problematic even if issues of welfare continue to
be improved, precisely because the harm suffered by research animals is only
a subset of the problem. As long as research involves the reification of other
animals, it will cause moral difficulties for those engaged in this research. It
is here that the concept of reification is particularly significant in helping us
move away from limited questions concerning the capacities or moral status
of animals. From Honneth's perspective, this is irrelevant in at least one impor
tant sense. "The things we encounter in our everyday dealings with the world
must also be regarded as entities to which we relate in an inappropriate way
when we apprehend them merely neutrally and according to external criteria"
(2006, p. 132).
6

Reification and Moral Injury

We have outlined the ways in which animal research involves the reification
of animals. However, a key part of our argument is that this, in turn, impacts
the people responsible for working with such animals. Reification, aside from
anything else, is a diminution, denial, or abrogation of moral agency. This can
work in two ways. First, the reifier denies that the entity in question is anything
other than a thing. Second, the very process of reification reflects back on the
moral agent. The person, who has the capacity to be a moral agent, comes to
feel and act as though this were not the case through reifying both their own
moral agency and the entities that they encounter.
This kind of situation may lead individuals into difficulties regarding wheth
er to continue to do work they find troubling. For example, some of those who
work in the animal house and as laboratory technicians construe themselves as
a type of intermediary between scientific researchers and animals, advocating
and protecting the latter (Birke, Arluke and Michael, 2007). This sets up a kind
of cognitive dissonance, which can be exacerbated by pressure from within the
organization. For example, informal advice to management from the Ameri
can Association for Laboratory Animal Science (2003) suggests supervisors
remind workers that "if they cannot perform an assigned task, someone else
will be required to do so" (p. 3). This means that individuals who care for the
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animals they work with, and who have built a rapport with them, can become
caught in a cycle whereby they feel personally obliged and institutionally pres
sured to persevere with this work in spite of the personal cost.
Staff who do care about the animals they work with are themselves be
ing reified by systemic and institutional pressures. The moral agency that
enables them to relate to the animal, to have a view as to how and whether
something should be done, may be stultified over time. Habermas also iden
tifies this problem - that of our capacity to reify ourselves - calling it the
"self-instrumentalization of the species" (2014). While Habermas was not con
cerned with animal research, he, nevertheless, offers a clear illustration of the
phenomenon he was concerned with. In seeking to instrumentalize other spe
cies, we simultaneously do the same to ourselves.

7

Loss of Moral Agency Leads to Moral Injury

The use of animals in research requires a narrowing of the social sphere, to ex
clude some entities or to limit the ways in which the interests of these entities
can serve to restrict our freedoms to act on them. In this way, moral agency is
constrained. In addition, the nature of scientific work often means that people
carry out procedures that have been defined and required by others, so that
moral implications, in relation to animals, may be doubly removed from the
individual's own sense of moral autonomy or agency. There are some parallels
here with the known problem of desensitization: those who cannot success
fully desensitize themselves to animal suffering are unlikely to thrive in jobs
that require animal research. Therefore there is an inbuilt incentive for scien
tists and researchers to seek to desensitize themselves actively, by reframing
their moral relationship with the animals (Capaldo, 2004).
We hyp othesize that habitually narrowing the scope of moral concern is a
source of moral injury to those who do it. Institutions and workplaces often
require this kind of narrowing. For example, to promote efficiencies, effort is
expended on an ever-smaller circle of those who matter. Thus, workers may
find themselves told to ignore the mold on the tomatoes in the burgers, or to
give parents misleading feedback on their children's reports, or to prioritize
the management's targets above any other concern they have relating to the
patient (Smajdor, 2013). There are many areas of modern life, maybe even most
workplaces, where the demands of efficiency are such that reification seems
inescapable. To this extent, the situation of those involved in animal research
may not be significantly different from those working in factories or universi
ties or engaged in other sorts of scientific or laboratory work. However, there
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is an important additional factor that feeds into the mix here. There are some
people whose occupations also involve intensely, ethically-charged decisions
or practices. These include those working as military personnel, medical pro
fessionals, and - we would argue - those involved in animal research.
The damaging effects of breaking strong moral taboos have previously been
discussed in the context of military and medical personnel. For example, both
medics and military personnel are more likely to witness, bring about, or be
involved in the death of other human beings. Both are required to perform ac
tions that cause harm to other individuals. Both may have to overcome feelings
of repugnance for what they do and to attempt to distance themselves from
normal human responses (Howe, Smajdor and Stocki, 2012; Smajdor, Salter and
Stocki, 2010). For these reasons and others, medical and military personnel are
at risk of moral injury (Litz et al., 2009; Steenkamp et al., 2011), and a variety
of strategies have been developed in order to encourage institutions and indi
viduals to identify these risks and deal with them. It may not be immediately
obvious that one can draw parallels between animal researchers and soldiers
or medics; but, in fact, proximity with death and witnessing or causing trauma
is likely to be part of all of these worlds, as is the need to function within highly
complex and hierarchical systems. These systems impose their own moral
demands and codes, which frequently conflict with the norms and expecta
tions of society. In these circumstances, a combination of strong social taboo
attached to the activity, reification, loss of agency, and the ethical complexity
of the role lends itself to a far higher risk of moral injury.
It is routinely accepted in modem societies that killing and harming ani
mals is prima facie wrong. Indeed, to participate in activities such as these
is usually against the law and/or regarded as immoral, unless carried out by
designated people. Even, or especially, in developed Western societies, whose
farming practices and research activities require that animals are used, killed,
or harmed, members of the public are not commonly involved in these prac
tices. What this means is that, just as doctors or members of the military are
engaged in breaking taboos, so too are people whose roles involve using or
harming animals. Animal researchers must contain their "normal" feelings, to
some extent, and refrain from "normal" moral and social judgements just as
soldiers do. Shifting between different moral contexts can, in itself, be a risk
for moral injury. The switch from war to civilian life is well recognized as a
source of stress, and this shift is one that animal researchers may undergo on
a lesser scale every day. In some senses, animal research is even more morally
taboo than military service. Soldiers can be, and often are, viewed as heroes. In
the contemporary environment, it is hard to envisage the same possibility for
animal researchers (Birke, Arluke and Michael, 2007, however, note that some
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pro-research campaigns seek to cast researchers as heroes for saving patients,
especially children). Furthermore, soldiers are often regarded as paradigmatic
examples of powerful, attractive men. It is not generally thought shameful to
be a soldier. Nor would one expect to have to keep this secret. Yet, away from
their colleagues, some animal researchers might feel shame, social stigma, and
exclusion based on what they do. As a result, they may feel impelled to keep the
nature of their work secret. Again, this taboo bears particularly on laboratory
technicians as opposed to researchers, since for the former group working with
animals in research constitutes the entirety of their role (Birke et al., 2007).
Aside from the elements of cognitive dissonance or shame attached to ani
mal research, which is perhaps a result of its problematic moral status in so
ciety, moral injury may arise in this context from a more direct and personal
feeling of being involved in wrongdoing. Again, this has parallels with military
situations. Moral injury can result from witnessing or being complicit in acts
that one feels to be wrong. One does not have to be a perpetrator of the act
in question in order to be damaged by it. A sense of helplessness, or percep
tion of being disempowered by the structures and systems within which one
works, can lead to situations where one's moral agency comes under threat.
Over time, this leads to a gradual hardening, or dissociation, as individuals
try to protect themselves from the sense of wrongdoing and become passive
and disempowered. If this dissociation is effective, a person may cease to feel
distress but may, nevertheless, continue to be damaged physiologically and
psychologically (Kammeyer-Mueller, Simon and Rich, 2010; Litz et al., 2009).
8

Addressing the Problem of Reification

Several strategies and remedies could be devised to limit or ameliorate reifi
cation and its associated moral harms in the context of animal experimenta
tion. For example, universities, hospitals, and other institutions where animal
research takes place could better acknowledge the kind of stresses and pres
sures placed on their workers and implement policies to support resilience,
perhaps akin to those adopted in the military setting. Although this may help
workers cope with the issues they confront (which is not insignificant), it does
not seem to get to the heart of the problem, namely, that biomedical research
requires the reification of animals and, in tum, the humans who work with
them. Another strategy may be to radically transform the practice of research
in such a way that the harms to animals are minimized and their intrinsic val
ue and subjectivity acknowledged. This could be facilitated by adopting the
animals-as-patients model argued for elsewhere (Johnson and Degeling, 2012).
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Animal patients shift the balance of harms to benefits for animals in research
and address some of the epistemological worries about the failure of animal
research to translate into human clinical benefit. A move towards regarding
animals as patients could represent one point along the way to a paradigm
shift in animal research. This, if successful, would radically alter the relation
ship between researchers and participants. It would no longer be necessary for
researchers to distance themselves from the animals' suffering, and, as with
research involving humans, the moral value of the research participant would
be an inbuilt aspect of the process.
It seems to us that, as with other major social shifts on complex issues, there
will not be a single knock down argument or historical, political, or economic
circumstance that will provoke change in animal research. Rather, change will
occur when a number of arguments and factors come together that all sup
port a new direction. We hope to have shown that there is a new argument
that can be mounted against animal research, one that is grounded in an
acknowledgement of the moral harms to humans that can result from involve
ment in animal experimentation. Contributing an argument that appeals to
human self-interest and does not depend on problematic attempts to establish
the moral status of animals or on reducing animals to their welfare, is, we hope,
promising and able to further gird a move away from the current, deeply prob
lematic, practice of animal research.
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